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# Pregled vsebine

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| PREDGOVOR  | 9   |
| OSVOBODILNA FRONTA, REVOLUCIJA IN NACIONALNO VPRAŠANJE   | 15  |
| <i>Priprave na revolucijo</i>  | 17  |
| <i>Ustanovitev Slovenskega narodnoosvobodilnega odbora</i>   | 45  |
| <i>Dolomitska izjava 65</i>  |     |
| <i>Izza kočevskega zbora – med pričakovanji in stvarnostjo</i>   | 126 |
| <i>Kocbekova misija v Rimu poleti 1944</i>   | 138 |
| PRIMORSKA – SLOVENSKI KOMUNISTI MED NACIONALIZMOM IN<br>INTERNACIONALIZMOM   | 159 |
| <i>"Naš odnos do Italijanov naj bo miren in dostojen, toda nič več".<br/>Slovenski komunisti in Italijani na Primorskem.</i> | 161 |
| <i>Primorska sredina in predvojni primorski protifašizem v očeh<br/>slovenskih komunistov med drugo svetovno vojno</i>       | 185 |
| KATOLIŠKI TABOR MED BALKANOM IN SREDNJO EVROPO   | 199 |
| <i>Slovenska ljudska stranka in vprašanje državnopravnega položaja<br/>Slovenije po napadu sil osi na Jugoslavijo</i>        | 201 |
| <i>Pobuda patra Kazimirja Zakrajška za ustanovitev slovenske države<br/>poleti 1941 v Združenih državah Amerike</i>          | 245 |
| <i>Lambert Ehrlich in zasnova slovenske države</i>   | 268 |
| <i>Škof Rožman in vprašanje državnega okvira med<br/>drugo svetovno vojno</i>  | 306 |
| <i>New York Times o načrtih za samostojno slovensko državo<br/>med drugo svetovno vojno</i>                                  | 315 |
| <i>Srednjeevropski integracijski načrti med letoma 1918 in 1945 ter Slovenci</i>   | 335 |
| POVZETEK   | 355 |
| SUMMARY  | 369 |
| VIRI IN LITERATURA   | 383 |
| OSEBNO KAZALO  | 403 |

## Povzetek

Po kratki aprilski vojni, ko je bila Kraljevina Jugoslavija napadena s strani sil osi, je 17. aprila 1941 jugoslovanska kraljeva vojska podpisala kapitulacijo. Posledica aprilske katastrofe je bila zasedba in razkosanje njenega ozemlja. Večino ozemlja so si prilastile sosednje države napadalke (Nemčija, Italija, Madžarska in Bolgarija), v osrednjem delu je nastala t. i. Neodvisna država Hrvatska (NDH), Srbija v mejah izpred 1912, povečana za Banat in Kosovsko Mitrovico, pa je bila pod neposredno nemško vojaško upravo ter je imela pod Milanom Ačimovićem in Milanom Nedićem omejeno avtonomijo. Jugoslovanska država dejansko (de facto) tako ni več obstajala, saj je bila za osne sile in za zagovornike "novega reda" le versajska tvorba, tako da so npr. ob razdelitvi njenega državnega premoženja govorili le še o "bivšem jugoslovanskem prostoru". Zanje je njen vojaški poraz hkrati pomenil tudi debelacijo Jugoslavije. Takega stanja (to je okupacije in razkosa) pa niso sprejele zavezniške sile (sprva le zahodne, saj je Sovjetska zveza, zaradi pakta z nacistično Nemčijo maja 1941 izgnala jugoslovanskega veleposlanika in šele septembra 1941 obnovila stike, takrat že z begunsko kraljevo vlado) in so podobno kot tudi druge vlade v begunstvu (npr. poljska, češkoslovaška itd.) tudi jugoslovansko kraljevo v Londonu še naprej priznavale kot legitimnega in legalnega jugoslovanskega zastopnika, tako da je v mednarodnem zavezniškem svetu formalno-pravno (de iure) vseskozi obstajala kontinuiteta jugoslovanske države.

Z aprilsko vojno je posebno težak postal položaj slovenskega naroda, ki ni bil le okupiran, temveč tudi razkosan. Nemški okupator je zasedel Štajersko in Gorenjsko, Italijani so na ozemlju Dolenjske in Notranjske ustanovili Ljubljansko pokrajino, Prekmurje so zasedli Madžari, najmanjši del (pet vasi v okolici Bregane) pa je po razmejitvi med nacistično Nemčijo in Neodvisno državo Hrvaško pripadel slednji. Če upoštevamo že predvojni položaj Slovencev, ki so živeli v štirih državah (poleg matične Jugoslavije, še v Italiji, v Nemčiji (Avstriji) in na Madžarskem), je bilo po okupaciji slovensko narodnostno ozemlje razdeljeno na 11 upravnih enot, od katerih je imela le Ljubljanska pokrajina središče na ozemlju današnje Republike Slovenije. Kakšna prihodnost je bila namenjena slovenskemu narodu v načrtih osnih sil, je bilo razvidno ne le iz raznarodovalnih ukrepov okupatorjev, temveč tudi npr. iz pogodbe o nasledstvu, kjer Slovenija oziroma Slovenci za razliko od Hrvaške in Srbije sploh niso bili omenjeni, kar je še dodatno potrjevalo mnenje, da za Slovence kot etnično enoto ni prostora v "novem" evropskem redu.

V takem težavnemu položaju je okupacija predstavljala za Slovence povsem nov položaj, ki pa dolgoročno ni imel samo slabih posledic. Vsi so se namreč zavedali, da je s kraljevsko Jugoslavijo, ki se je zrušila, kot je napovedal že dr. Anton Korošec, "wie ein Kartenhaus", konec tudi predvojnega političnega in nasploh vrednostnega sistema, kar pa seveda še ni samodejno in pri vseh pomenilo tudi želje po spremembi predvojnega razmerja političnih moči. Z okupacijo ni razpadla le Jugoslavija, temveč so bili z ustanovitvijo NDH prekinjeni tudi fizični stiki z drugimi jugoslovanskimi narodi in Slovenci so ostali sami in prepuščeni samim sebi. Po drugi strani se je tako odpirala tudi možnost za nov razmislek o prihodnjem narodovem življenju in nenazadnje tudi o bodočem državnem okviru. Nakazovala se je (vsaj teoretično) možnost, da iz vidika naših nacionalnih interesov odločamo o odnosu do bodočih morebitnih povezav. Hkrati

pa so tedanje razmere dovoljevale, da pridejo na dan tudi morebitni do tedaj iz različnih razlogov skriti in prikrivani načrti o bodoči usodi slovenskega naroda, ki bi odprli nove perspektive njegovemu nadaljnjemu razvoju.

Medvojno dogajanje na Slovenskem lahko označimo kot prepletanje marsikdaj protislovnih procesov, zajetih v pojmi okupacija, osvobodilni boj, revolucija, državljanska vojna in kolaboracija. V teh kompleksnih razmerah sta se izoblikovala dva, med seboj sovražna tabora, na eni strani osvobodilno gibanje pod vodstvom slovenskih komunistov in na drugi strani protirevolucionarni tabor. Kljub medsebojni sovražnosti se je v obeh taborih izoblikoval podoben narodnopolitični program, in sicer Zedinjena Slovenije v federativno oblikovani, obnovljeni in razširjeni jugoslovanski državi. Samoumevno je, da je tak program predvideval zmago protifašistične koalicije. Ključna razlika pa je bila, da se je osvobodilno gibanje zaradi revolucionarnih razlogov zavzemalo za republikansko ureditev, medtem ko je protirevolucija zaradi legalističnega principa večino časa vztrajala na monarhistični ureditvi. Legalizem je protirevoluciji ustrezal preteženi del vojne, a so se mu v zaključnem obdobju zaradi sporazuma med voditeljem osvobodilnega gibanja Josipom Brozom Titom in predsednikom kraljeve begunske vlade Ivanom Šubašićem odrekli. Sicer pa osvobodilno gibanje vprašanja monarhije zaradi mednarodno političnih razlogov med vojno taktično ni posebej izpostavljalo. Osvobodilnemu gibanju je uspelo na specifičen način legitimirati svoj položaj pred zavezniki v protihitlerjevski koaliciji. S stališča mednarodne zavezniške skupnosti prevzem oblasti zaradi sporazumov med Titom in Šubašićem ni bil izpeljan na revolucionaren način (na mesto predsednika začasne vlade je Tita marca 1945 imenovalo kraljevo namestništvo), to pa seveda ni pomenilo, da nova oblast na notranjepolitičnem področju ni začela uvajati sprememb, ki so pretrgale kontinuiteto s predvojno družbeno ureditvijo. Po drugi strani tudi drži, da so bili dosledno privrženi monarhiji predvsem slovenski liberalci, medtem ko bi se bili v katoliškem taboru v končni konsekvenci pripravljeni prilagoditi tudi republikanski ureditvi. Poleg tega je Osvobodilna fronta bistveno bolj poudarjala pravico do samoodločbe in atribute državnosti, ki naj bi jih Slovenija pridobila kot federativna enota v novi jugoslovanski skupnosti, kot pa nasprotna stran, ki je na avtonomni položaj Slovenije gledala z izrazito pragmatičnega vidika, brez večjih ambicij na državnopravnem področju. Hkrati velja omeniti, da je trialistična inačica notranje federativne državne ureditve monarhije (srbska dinastija Karadjordjevičev), ki jo je zagovarjala protirevolucionarna stran, že v izhodišču v veliko večji meri predstavljala nevarnost pred srbsko prevlado tudi v novi državi, kot pa je to veljalo za federalistični koncept (pet ali šest federalnih enot) osvobodilnega gibanja. Močno se je razlikoval tudi vpliv, ki so ga imeli Slovenci pri oblikovanju novih notranjih razmerij v Jugoslaviji. V osvobodilnem gibanju je Edvard Kardelj, ki je imel zelo pomembno vlogo v KPJ, odločilno oblikoval nacionalno politiko na jugoslovanski ravni in je bil teoretični utemeljitelj avnojskih odlokov, medtem ko na protirevolucionarni strani po Koroščevi smrti med slovenskimi politiki ni bilo osebe, ki bi lahko krojila jugoslovansko politiko.

Poleg javno deklariranega narodnopolitičnega programa, skupnega vsem ključnim političnim dejavnikom, se je med vojno pojavilo kar nekaj pomembnih in zanimivih izjem pa tudi geneza nastanka programa in v nekaterih pogledih tudi njegovo razumevanje (zlasti glede stopnje federativnosti), je bilo pri obeh taborih nekoliko različno. Predvsem pa se je pojavljala cela vrsta dilem in vprašanj, povezanih z narodnopolitičnimi cilji skozi celotno dobo okupacije.

Osvobodilno fronto slovenskega naroda, konec aprila 1941 ustanovljeno kot protiimperialistično fronto, so sestavljale temeljne skupine (KPS, katoliška skupina, slovensko usmerjen del Sokola in kulturni delavci) in plenumske skupine, ki jih je bilo okoli 10. V izvršnem odboru Osvobodilne fronte so imeli zastopnike le predstavniki temeljnih skupin, kar kaže, da so te imele pomembnejšo vlogo kot plenumske skupine in so predstavljale jedro organizacije. Do dolomitske izjave je imela Osvobodilna fronta nekaj koalicijskih značilnosti, ni pa nikoli bila koalicija enakovrednih partnerjev. KPS je imela dejansko vodilno vlogo od samega začetka organiziranja odpora in si je zagotovila monopolni položaj v partizanski vojski, propagandi in varnostnoobveščevalni službi. Iz tega sledi, da je bilo tudi glede slovenskega nacionalnega vprašanja v Osvobodilni fronti odločilno stališče KPS. Slovenski komunisti so vseskozi vztrajali na načelni pravici do samoodločbe narodov in na programu Zedinjene Slovenije.

Slovenski komunisti kot tudi mnogi drugi slovenski politiki ob začetku okupacije niso verjeli v možnost obnovitve Jugoslavije, posebej še ker so v skladu s predvojnimi teoretičnimi predpostavkami pričakovali, da druga svetovna vojna predstavlja tudi izhodišče za bodočo svetovno revolucijo (izbruhnila naj bi v nacistični Nemčiji), v predvideni sovjetski ureditvi Evrope pa ni bilo prostora za Jugoslavijo, ki je po njihovem prepričanju predstavljala umetno versajsko tvorbo. V takem gledanju je slovenske komuniste utrjeval tudi izgon jugoslovanskega veleposlanika iz Moskve maja 1941, torej v času veljavnosti pakta Hitler–Stalin, in s tem v bistvu de facto sovjetskega priznanja razkosa Jugoslavije. Na tretjem zasedanju vrhovnega plenuma Osvobodilne fronte 16. septembra 1941 je bil ustanovljen SNOO, ki "za časa osvobodilne borbe edini predstavlja, zastopa, organizira in vodi slovenski narod" v sklopu priprav na narodno revolucijo, a dejansko ni imel pomembnejše vloge ter se je po četrtem zasedanju 1. novembra 1941, ko so bile sprejete temeljne točke Osvobodilne fronte ponovno sestali šele v Kočevju oktobra 1943. Ob konstituiranju SNOO so sprejeli tudi štiri odloke, ki pa zaradi ohlapne opredelitve, povezane s tedanjo relativno šibkostjo osvobodilnega gibanja, sprva niso prinesli večjega pretresa v tedanjo slovensko družbo, so pa v določeni meri že nakazovali smer razvoja dogodkov v Sloveniji. Do poskusa celovite uveljavitve odlokov SNOO je dejansko prišlo šele po objavi vesti o spopadu med partizani in četniki v Srbiji, ki je v tem pogledu z januarskimi (1942) pismi centralnega komiteja KPJ pomenila usodno prelomnico v zaostrovanju odnosov.

Tudi v temeljnih točkah Osvobodilne fronte, ki veljajo za njen program, je odnos do jugoslovanske države dvoumen. V začetku 1942 pa so v Osvobodilni fronti na Kardeljevo pobudo (tedaj je bil v Bosni) znova začeli odločneje govoriti o samoodločbi in pri tem izrecno poudarjati pravico slovenskega naroda do odcepitve brez omembe Jugoslavije. Pri tem so slovenski komunisti zagovarjali stališče, da mora slovenski narod na temelju pravice do samoodločbe najprej doseči suverenost, šele na teh osnovah pa bodo razpravljali o njegovih morebitnih povezavah. Tiste, ki so zagovarjali jugoslovansko rešitev, so označevali za podpornike velikosrbskega hegemonizma in unitarizma. Nasprotno pa je protirevolucionarna stran obtoževala OF, da je proti Jugoslaviji in da podpira ustanovitev zveze srednjeevropskih sovjetskih republik in s tem (domnevno) razprodaja slovensko zemljo Italijanom in Nemcem.

Za jugoslovanski državni okvir se je KPS dokončno odločila po bihaškem zasedanju Avnoja konec leta 1942. To sicer ni pomenilo, da ga je dotlej vseskozi izrecno odklanjala, temveč le, da se glede tega vprašanja še ni dokončno izjasnila.

Znano je, da se je KPJ od srede dvajsetih let pa do srede tridesetih let dvajsetega stoletja zavzemala za razbitje Jugoslavije, nato je v času ljudskofrontne politike v drugi polovici tridesetih let sicer to stališče spremenila, vendar še ni dokončno opustila svoje prvotne ideje. Slovenski (pa tudi jugoslovanski) komunisti so odnos do Jugoslavije obravnavali skozi prizmo njihovega strateškega in primarnega cilja – ta je bil osvojitve oblasti in izgradnja boljševiškega sistema. Jeseni 1942 je, po opozorilu Kominterne, dokončno dozorelo spoznanje, da v času vojne, to je do zloma osnih sil, ni pričakovati razraščanja vojaškega spopada v revolucionarno vojno v Evropi in s tem povezanega razpada protihitlerjevske koalicije. To spoznanje predstavlja eno ključnih prelomnic v oblikovanju strategije, ki je osvobodilnemu gibanju v pogojih splošneevropskega protiokupatorskega in protihitlerjevskega boja omogočilo prevzem oblasti, to je istočasno izvedbo revolucije. S tem so dokončno padli v vodo tudi komunistični načrti o sovjetski ureditvi Evrope. Med poveljnimi cilji protihitlerjevske koalicije je bila tudi obnova jugoslovanske države. To spremembo je Kardelj v pismu J. B. Titu sredi decembra 1942 komentiral, "da je sedaj že očitno, da se lahko bomo mednarodno najlažje utrdili prav čez Jugoslavijo."

V vodstvu KPJ je jeseni 1942 vse bolj naraščala težnja po centralizaciji osvobodilnih gibanj iz posameznih jugoslovanskih pokrajin. Ta so se dotlej v različnih pokrajinskih razmerah razvijala precej samostojno in specifično v skladu s splošnimi smernicami osrednjega jugoslovanskega vodstva. Naenkrat pa ni bilo več prostora za raznolikosti in samosvoje značilnosti. To se je prvič jasno pokazalo ob prihodu načelnika vrhovnega štaba NOPOJ Arse Jovanovića, ki je začel po prihodu v Slovenijo že konec leta 1942 prenašati bosanske vzorce v slovensko okolje in s tem kršiti slovensko suverenost, ki jo je zastopal izvršni odbor Osvobodilne fronte. Najizraziteje so se težnje po poenotenju pokazale s prihodom Iva Lole Ribarja iz vrhovnega štaba NOPOJ v Slovenijo, kjer je ostal od januarja do aprila 1943. Na podlagi njegovih pripomb se je vodstvo slovenskih komunistov odločilo, da prisili zaveznike v Osvobodilni fronti k podpisu dolomitske izjave (1. marec 1943). S tem aktom je bila KPS v Osvobodilni fronti tudi formalno zagotovljena vodilna vloga (dejansko jo je imela tudi že pred tem), krščanski socialisti in Sokoli pa so se odpovedali nadaljnjemu snovanju lastne organizacije. Osvobodilna fronta je tako postala monolitna organizacija, ki je bila skladna z načinom delovanja komunistov v ostalih jugoslovanskih pokrajinah. Ukinitvev slovenske specifikje je bil tudi bistveni razlog za sprejetje dolomitske izjave. Ker so razlogi za ta akt krnili slovensko suverenost, na katero so bili nekomunistični zavezniki v Osvobodilni fronti zelo občutljivi, so slovenski komunisti prave vzroke za njen podpis prikrili in odgovornost prevalili na pleča krščanskih socialistov.

Z dokončno odločitvijo komunistov za jugoslovanski državni okvir je bilo takoj jasno, da bo nova država zgrajena na drugačnih temeljih od predvojne kraljevine. Ostajalo pa je odprto vprašanje formalno-pravne rešitve jugoslovanskega nacionalnega vprašanja, s katero bi jasno podčrtali razliko od predvojne države. Na bihaškem zasedanju Avnoja, kjer ni bilo slovenskih in makedonskih predstavnikov, tem vprašanjem niso posvetili večje pozornosti. Nasprotno pa se je Kardelj, ki je bil v času bihaškega zasedanja Avnoja v Sloveniji, zavedal izjemnega pomena teh vprašanj ter je posebej poudarjal, da je potrebno vstop jugoslovanskih narodov v novo državno skupnost izpeljati formalnopravno po načelu samoodločbe narodov. Kardelj je menil, da je ravno vprašanje samoodločbe narodov najmočnejše orožje proti velikosrbskemu

hegemonizmu, ki ga je imel za največjo nevarnost osvobodilnemu gibanju. Na drugem zasedanju Avnoja v Jajcu je bil na podlagi pravice do samoodločbe narodov sprejet odlok o federativni ureditvi nove države, kar je pomenilo prevlado Kardeljevega koncepta. Tako lahko štejemo Kardelja za idejno-teoretičnega utemeljitelja druge Jugoslavije. V tem kontekstu je imel kočevski zbor na začetku oktobra 1943 zgolj manifestativno vlogo, potrdil je slovensko odločitev za življenje v skupni jugoslovanski državi. Ni pa bilo na kočevskem zboru Slovincem danih nobenih vnaprejšnjih zagotovil o njihovem položaju v novi državni skupnosti, to je bilo prepuščeno bodočemu razvoju dogodkov.

Pri oblikovanju temeljev bodoče državne skupnosti je šlo za vprašanja, ki so bila le navidez zgolj formalno-pravne narave. Dejansko so že ob njenem oblikovanju obstajali različni pogledi na povojno notranjo ureditev. Avnojski odloki v Jajcu iz jeseni 1943 so bili tako le kompromis, ki ni bistveno spremenil že od jeseni 1942 potekajoče centralizacije in poenotenja posameznih gibanj. Ta proces se je nato proti koncu vojne ter v prvih povojnih letih le še stopnjeval. Monistična narava povojnega režima, ki je temeljil na komunistični partiji in vojski kot veznem tkivu, je sicer pomenila, da je bila federativnost v precejšnji meri navidezna, a so imeli formalnopravno zagotovljeni atributi državnosti vendarle tudi svojo težo pri oblikovanju odnosov v državi.

Posebnost v delovanju slovenskih komunistov predstavlja njihovo udejstvovanje na Primorskem, ki je bilo razpeto med nacionalizmom in internacionalizmom. Na predvojnem Primorskem, tedaj delu Kraljevine Italije, je na obrobju slovenskega etničnega ozemlja (Trst, Gorica) živelo tudi avtohtono italijansko prebivalstvo. Kljub načelnemu internacionalističnemu zavzemanju za sodelovanje med Slovenci in Italijani pa je do tega prišlo le v redkih primerih (npr. med delavci v Trstu, vojaško sodelovanje). Zato so se morali tudi slovenski komunisti, skladno z večinskim prepričanjem slovenskega prebivalstva na Primorskem, ki temu ni bilo naklonjeno, temu prilagajati in zavzeti odločno nacionalno stališče tudi v odnosu do italijanskih komunistov. Prav tako so morali slovenski komunisti prvoten povsem negativen odnos do predvojnega nacionalnega protifašističnega gibanja na Primorskem prilagoditi do te mere, da so nekatere njegove vidike sprejeli kot pozitivne, seveda na tak način, da vodilna vloga komunistov v osvobodilnem boju ni bila ogrožena.

Slovenska protirevolucija je skupna oznaka za vse tiste politične skupine, ki jih je družilo odklonilno stališče do Osvobodilne fronte in partizanstva. Sicer pa je kazala pisano podobo tako po raznolikosti skupin kot tudi po mnogoplastni dejavnosti. Najpomembnejše so bile predvojne tradicionalne stranke, zlasti katoliška Slovenska ljudska stranka (SLS) in pa skupine, ki so tvorile liberalni blok. Za nasprotnike partizanstva je bila značilna organizacijska kot tudi geografska neenotnost, saj je enega od dejavnikov predstavljala tudi politična emigracija v Veliki Britaniji in Ameriki, ki je odšla iz domovine ob okupaciji. Pomemben dodatni vidik neenotnosti in razpršenosti protirevolucionarnega tabora je bil ta, da je del zaradi nasprotovanja komunistični revoluciji javno kolaboriral z okupatorji, kar je seveda pogojevalo razlike v javnem opredeljevanju do narodnopolitičnih ciljev. V drugačnem položaju je bil ilegalni del protirevolucije in tisti v tujini, ki pri oblikovanju narodnopolitičnih ciljev nista imela tovrstnih težav razen seveda, da jih je moral prvi objavljati tajno.

Slovenski liberalci so ves čas okupacije vztrajali na legalističnem principu obnove federativno urejene jugoslovanske monarhije, zato je bila pozornost

raziskovanja nacionalne problematike v protirevolucionarnem taboru osredotočena predvsem na stališča katoliške strani.

Vodstvo SLS je 30. marca 1941 določilo strategijo za prihajajoče vojne razmere in med drugim sklenilo, da njeno vodstvo in njeni organi ne bodo sodelovali z oblastmi sovražnih držav. V nasprotju s to odločitvijo sta voditelja SLS Fran Kulovec in Miha Krek skušala 5. aprila 1941, torej dan pred napadom na Jugoslavijo, preko slovaškega posredništva v Beogradu pri nemških oblasteh doseči, da bi bila ustanovljena skupna slovensko-hrvaška država ali pa samostojna slovenska država pod nemško zaščito. Najverjetnejši razlog za tako korenito spremembo stališča je bilo razkritje nemških načrtov v zvezi z Jugoslavijo, ki so bili izrazito neugodni za Slovence. Pri Kulovcu pa je bil prisoten tudi močan dvom, da bo Jugoslavijo še kdaj mogoče obnoviti. V novih razmerah se je najboljši položaj obetal Hrvatom (predvidena ustanovitev samostojne države), zato se je celotno pobuda usmerila k podobni rešitvi tudi za Slovence, tako da je za tedanji vrh katoliške politike hrvaški primer predstavljal vzor. V skladu s to usmeritvijo je skušal v Ljubljani ban Dravske banovine Marko Natlačen prodreti z idejo samostojne slovenske države pod nemško zaščito, a je bil v svojih poskusih neuspešen, ker na nemški strani ni bilo nikakršnega posluha za to pobudo. Kasnejše Natlačnovo delovanje (naslonitev na Italijane in poskus združitve slovenskega ozemlja pod Italijo, ustanovitev konzulte in njen obisk v Rimu pri papežu in Mussoliniju, ponoven poskus navezave stikov s Hitlerjem) je pomenilo nadaljevanje s strani Kulovca in Kreka začete pobude, ki je izvirala iz prepričanja o dolgotrajnosti prevlade sil osi ter prepričanja, da v takih razmerah obnovitev Jugoslavije ni verjetna. S poskusi pridobiti si podporo na osni strani je Natlačen prenehal šele po obisku v Rimu junija 1941 in še to ne zato, ker bi menil, da je ta politika zgrešena, temveč, ker na drugi strani ni bilo nobenega pozitivnega odgovora. Usoda Slovenije je bila zapečatenata že pred napadom na Jugoslavijo, ko je Hitler v pripravah na njeno okupacijo posebej poudaril, da Slovenci (in Srbi) nikoli niso bili nemški prijatelji, tako da je bilo Kulovčevo in Natlačnovo delovanje že vnaprej obsojeno na neuspeh. Njuno problematično delovanje zato odpira celo vrsto (moralno-etičnih, formalno-pravnih itd.) vprašanj.

Po napadu nacistične Nemčije na Sovjetsko zvezo je postalo prepričanje v zmago zavezniških sil vsesplošno. Kljub temu zaupanje v obnovo Jugoslavije v katoliškem taboru tudi zaradi obstoja NDH in obračunavanja ustaškega režima s Srbi še vedno ni prevladalo. Temeljna dilema v katoliškem taboru poleti 1941 je bila, ali se povezovati kot samostojna država v Srednjo Evropo ali pa znotraj obnovljene jugoslovanske države na Balkan. Značilen odsev tedanjega razpoloženja v katoliškem taboru je pobuda patra Kazimirja Zakrajška, ki se je v Združenih državah Amerike, kamor je odšel po navodilih bivšega bana Natlačna in ljubljanskega škofa Rožmana, pri ameriških oblasteh zavzemal za samostojno slovensko državo. Tedanja vodilna osebnost katoliškega tabora Natlačen se je tako sprva celo bolj nagibal k samostojni slovenski državi, a se ni povsem jasno opredelil do septembra 1941, ko se je odločil za Jugoslavijo, katere federalni del naj bo Zedinjena Slovenija. Takrat je prišlo do pogovorov in do oblikovanja narodnopolitičnega programa v dogovoru med Natlačnom, vodjem SLS v domovini, in Kramarjem, voditeljem slovenskih liberalcev, ki je predvideval: "1) Obnovljeno in razširjeno Kraljevino Jugoslavijo 2) Samostojen in ravnopraven sestavni del Jugoslavije bodi svobodna Slovenija z vsem njej na podlagi narodnostnega načela pripadajočim gospodarskim in prometno zaokroženim ozemljem 3) Notranja ureditev obnovljene Jugoslavije se mora izvršiti v soglasju



vseh njenih sestavnih delov na podlagi enakosti pravic in dolžnosti na federativni podlagi." Pri Natlačnu je šlo glede poudarjanja federativnega načela za nadaljevanje predvojne politike, čeprav je Kramerju popustil v toliko, da je bila na prvem mestu omenjena Jugoslavija, medtem ko je sprejetje federativnega načela za liberalce predstavljalo veliko prelomnico, posebej če se ozremo na njihova predvojna stališča glede nacionalnega vprašanja in notranje državne ureditve (unitarizem in centralizem). S takim kompromisom mnogi v katoliškem taboru niso bili zadovoljni in je do soglasja prišlo šele po posegu emigrantskih politikov spomladi 1942 in smrti Lamberta Ehrlicha. Sicer pa je postal narodnopolitični program slovenske protirevolucije odslej stalnica in ga zasledimo v vseh nadaljnjih političnih izjavah. Tako je ta program 23. novembra 1941 na londonskem radiu (od tu poimenovanje "londonske točke") predstavil Alojzij Kuhar. Enako stališče je razvidno spomladi 1942 v programu Slovenske zaveze in nato v narodni izjavi iz jeseni 1944, ki jo je izdal Narodni odbor za Slovenijo. Končno pa se pojavlja še v zadnjem domačem ilegalnem dejanju slovenske protirevolucije, to je na "zgodovinski seji prvega slovenskega parlamenta" na Taboru 3. maja 1945.

Kljub tem ponavljajočim se načelnim izjavam lahko še vedno sledimo tudi mnogim perečim vprašanjem, ki so se v zvezi z narodnopolitičnim programom pojavljale v katoliškem taboru, le da se je težišče dilem prestavilo iz domovine v emigracijo. Kakor se je zaupanje v obnovo jugoslovanske države v domovini postopoma krepilo, pa se je v emigraciji ob začetnih odločnih besedah že kmalu pojavil tudi dvom, ali bo jugoslovansko državo sploh še mogoče obnoviti. Najpomembnejši je bil srbsko-hrvaški spor med emigranti, ki je bil ozemeljskega značaja (vprašanje razmejitve) in ustavnega značaja (vprašanje notranje ureditve) in se je še posebej zaostril po novicah iz domovine, ki so govorile o ustaških pokolih srbskega prečanskega prebivalstva. Skrbi slovenskih politikov so se v londonskem okolju, ki je bilo tudi zatočišče najrazličnejšim političnim emigrantom in kjer se je na veliko govorilo o vsemogočih kombinacijah o povojni ureditvi Evrope, še okrepile, tako da so ti začeli razmišljati tudi o nejugoslovanskih rešitvah (samostojna slovenska država v zaledju Trsta in skupna slovensko-hrvaška država). Teh opcij sprva sicer niso javno razglašali, toda jeseni 1942 se je Miha Krek odločil za seznanitev mednarodne javnosti tudi z nejugoslovanskimi rešitvami. Tako je bilo januarja 1943 v New York Timesu v članku izpod peresa uglednega novinarja Cyrusa Lea Sulzbergerja objavljeno stališče, da so Slovenci, če ne uspe obnova Jugoslavije, za samostojno slovensko državo s Trstom in z mednarodnimi garancijami. Zamisel ni bila nova, temveč je šlo le za oživitev Koroščevih razmišljanj iz spomladi 1940, ko so se pojavili načrti o bodoči ureditvi Evrope, ki so predvidevali ustanovitev podonavske federacije. Kot protiutež avstrijski vlogi v novi federaciji so obudili zamisel Arnolda Toynbeeja iz leta 1915 o samostojni slovenski državi v zaledju Trsta in jo zaradi tega poimenovali "angleški načrt". Že pred tem je s to opcijo Krek seznanil tudi škofa Rožmana in vodstvo Slovenske zaveze ter jo predstavil kot možno rešitev, ki je v mednarodnih okvirih aktualna. Spomladi 1943 je s to idejo Krek seznanil Britance, ki pa so mu odgovorili, naj se z njo ne ukvarja, ker je uradni cilj britanske politike obnova Jugoslavije. Tudi slovenski politiki, zbrani v Slovenski zavezi, se z omenjeno pobudo slovenske države niso strinjali ter so v obširni utemeljitvi vztrajali na jugoslovanski rešitvi slovenskega nacionalnega vprašanja.

Med zasedbo so se v protirevolucionarnem taboru pojavljale tudi takšne rešitve slovenskega narodnega vprašanja, ki že v temelju niso predvidevale vključitve

Slovenije v Jugoslavijo. Zagovorniki teh rešitev so bili v glavnem iz politično manj pomembnih skupin ali zgolj posamezniki. Razlogi in ideje so bili zelo različni. Izrazito ideološko (protikomunistično) je bila pogojena pobuda obveščevalca, polkovnika Vladimirja Vauhnikarja po umiku v Švico poleti 1944, ko je v iskanju rešitve Slovenije pred prevlado komunizma prišel na dan z idejo o svobodni Sloveniji s poudarkom, da gre za zaledje Trsta in s tem namenom predložil poseben memorandum ameriškemu predstavniku v Švici Allanu Dullesu.

Kot konkurenčni načrt in alternativo narodnopolitičnemu programu SLS pa velja poudariti predvsem načrt voditelja "stražarjev" Lamberta Ehrlichar "Slovenski problem", ki so ga poslali po skrivni poteh slovenskim predstavnikom v London, da ga predložijo merodajnim zavezniškim predstavnikom. "Stražarji" so se s slovenskim nacionalnim vprašanjem precej ukvarjali v različnih brošurah in programskih besedilih. Med okupacijo so ilegalno izdajali revijo "Slovenija in Evropa", kar naj bi simbolično odražalo željo "stražarjev", da naj se slovensko nacionalno vprašanje načeloma ne obravnava že vnaprej v okviru Jugoslavije, temveč Evrope. "Stražarji" so stali na načelnem stališču, da mora slovenski narod najprej doseči suverenost in šele nato se bo odločalo o njegovih morebitnih povezavah. Torej identično stališče kot so ga zagovarjali slovenski komunisti. Pri svojih razmišljanjih so izhajali iz predpostavke, da je za trajno rešitev slovenskega narodnega vprašanja potrebno izriniti nemški vpliv iz srednje Evrope, kjer naj bi se ozemeljsko povezali s Severnimi Slovani, s katerimi naj bi prevladovali v tem delu Evrope. V primeru uresničitve te srednjeevropske pobude, katera skupna lastnost naj bi bila tudi katolištvo, pa niso izključevali tudi možnosti povezave z južnoslovanskimi narodi, čeprav ji niso bili pretirano naklonjeni zaradi ogrožene prevlade katolištva. Iz te pobude se je razvila ideja Intermarija, tj. federalne povezave narodov od Baltika do Egejskega morja, ki naj bi ščitila male srednjeevropske narode tako pred nemško kot pred sovjetsko nevarnostjo. Pri zavezniški diplomaciji Ehrlichovi predlogi, ki jih ni podpiralo niti vodstvo SLS, niso naleteli na pozitiven odmev.

V celoti gledano med Slovenci v času druge svetovne vojne ne moremo govoriti o posebej razviti potrebi za povojno povezovanje v srednjeevropskem prostoru. Na podlagi predhodnih zgodovinskih izkušenj ter dejstva, da so prav iz tega prostora prihajali napadalci, to v tistem času niti ni bilo tako nenavadno in je pojem Srednje Evrope zlasti v pomenu Mitteleurope v določenem kontekstu lahko imel celo negativen prizvok. V iskanju rešitev glede državnopravnega položaja Slovenije je v obeh taborih sčasoma kot najbolj realna (tako zaradi mednarodnih kot notranjepolitičnih razlogov) prevladala jugoslovanska opcija. Položaj Slovenije v novi jugoslovanski skupnosti je bil sicer ugodnejši od položaja v prvi Jugoslaviji, vendar tudi ta ni izpolnil vseh pričakovanj.

## Summary

On April 17, 1941, only a few days after the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had been attacked by the Axis Powers, the Yugoslav Royal Army signed the unconditional capitulation. As a result of this April catastrophe, Yugoslavia was occupied and parcelled out. Most of its territory was appropriated by the neighbouring aggressor states: Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria. At its centre, the Independent State of Croatia was founded. Serbia, whose pre-1912 borders had been enlarged with the inclusion of Banat and Kosovska Mitrovica, was placed under direct German military command, enjoying a limited autonomy under Milan Ačimović in Milan Nedić. Thus the Yugoslav state, which was only a Versailles creation in the eyes of the Axis Powers and the promoters of the New Order, *de facto* ceased to exist. During the distribution of its state assets, they only referred to it as the "former Yugoslav territory". For them, Yugoslavia's military defeat also meant its debilitation. From the outset, this situation of occupation and parcelling out was opposed by the Allies, with the exception of the Soviet Union which, due to its pact with Germany, expelled the Yugoslav ambassador in May 1941. It only re-established diplomatic links with the by then exiled Yugoslav royal government in September 1941. Like other exiled governments (such as the Polish and Czechoslovak) the Allies continued to acknowledge the royal Yugoslav government in London as a legitimate and lawful representative of its nation. In this respect, the formal (*de iure*) continuity of the Yugoslav state was preserved in the international Allied community.

After the April war the Slovenes found themselves in a particularly difficult situation, with their territory not only occupied but also distributed between several occupiers. Germans occupied Styria (Štajerska) and Upper Carniola (Gorenjska). Italians established the Province of Ljubljana on the territory of Lower (Dolenjska) and Inner Carniola (Notranjska). Prekmurje was occupied by Hungary. The smallest portion (five villages around Bregana) was allotted to the Independent State of Croatia in the wake of the frontier demarcation between it and Nazi Germany. After the occupation, the ethnic territory of the Slovenes who, before the Second World War, had lived in four states - Italy, Germany (Austria) and Hungary - as well as in their wider, Yugoslav motherland, was divided into eleven administrative units. Out of these, only the Province of Ljubljana had its centre located on the territory of the present Republic of Slovenia. The future the Axis Powers had in mind for the Slovene people was evident not only from the occupiers' assimilation measures, but also from the succession treaty in which Slovenia, unlike Croatia and Serbia, was not even mentioned, thus additionally strengthening the opinion that there was no room for Slovenes as an ethnic unit in the "new" European order.

In this difficult situation of the occupation, Slovenes found themselves in a completely new position, the long-term consequences of which, however, were not only negative. Whilst all were aware that the demise of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which, as predicted by Dr Anton Korošec, collapsed like "a house made of cards", also meant the end of the pre-war political and general value systems, not everyone necessarily desired the change in the balance of political power. Not only did Yugoslavia disintegrate as a result of the occupation, but the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia also interrupted any physical contacts between Slovenes and other Yugoslav peoples, leaving them isolated and

abandoned to their own devices. This, on the other hand, also prompted the reflections over the nation's future and statehood. Under the circumstances, a remote possibility emerged that the Slovenes could decide on possible future associations on the basis of their national interests. At the same time, plans for the future fate of the Slovene nation, that had been kept secret and concealed for various reasons, came to light, opening new perspectives for its development.

The wartime events in Slovenia can be described as a combination of often contradictory processes, contained in the terms, such as occupation, liberation struggle, revolution, civil war and collaboration. In these complex circumstances, two mutually hostile camps developed: the Communist led National Liberation Movement (hereafter the NLM) on one side, and the counter-revolutionary camp, on the other. In spite of their differences, the two camps developed similar political programmes, envisaging a unified Slovenia in a restored, extended and federal Yugoslav state. It goes without saying that such programmes also envisaged the victory of the anti-Fascist coalition. The key difference was that the NLM, for revolutionary reasons, strove for a republic arrangement, while the counter-revolutionary movement, given its legalist principle, most of the time insisted on a monarchy. Although legalism suited counter-revolutionaries for the best part of the war, they renounced it in its final stages, after an agreement between Josip Broz-Tito, the NLM leader, and Ivan Šubašić, the Prime Minister of the exiled royal government, was reached. During the war, the NLM, for tactical reasons, avoided addressing the question of monarchy. In a specific manner, the NLM succeeded in legitimising its status in front of the Allies, as part of the anti-Hitler coalition. Due to the agreements between Šubašić and Tito, who had been appointed prime minister of the provisional Yugoslav government by the royal regency in March 1945, the international Allied community did not consider that, in Yugoslavia, power had been usurped by means of a revolution. This, of course, did not mean that the new regime refrained from introducing changes in domestic politics which broke with the pre-war social order. On the other hand, it is also true that the most fervent supporters of the monarchy were Slovene Liberals, while those from the Catholic camp were, at the end of the day, even prepared to adapt to a republic. Besides, the Liberation Front (hereafter LF) gave much more emphasis to the right of self-determination and the statehood attributes Slovenia was supposed to gain as a federal unit in the new Yugoslav community than the opposite side which looked at Slovenia's autonomy from a very pragmatic viewpoint, without major ambitions regarding statehood symbols. It should also be mentioned that, in the new state, the trialist federal arrangement by the Yugoslav monarchy (the Serbian dynasty of Karadjordjević), defended from the outset by the counter-revolutionary side, would present a much greater danger of Serbian hegemony in a new state than the federalist concept of five or six units proposed by the NLM. The influence exerted by the Slovenes on the shaping of new relations within Yugoslavia was also very different. Edvard Kardelj, who played a very important role in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (hereafter the CPY), had a decisive influence on the policy making at the Yugoslav level, being also the theoretical founder of the AVNOJ declarations. The opposite camp, however, after the death of Korošec had no Slovene politician capable of shaping the Yugoslav politics.

Apart from the publicly declared political programme, common to all key political protagonists, some significant and interesting exceptions emerged during the war. The development and, in some aspects, the concept of the programme,

especially with regards to the degree of federalism, was somewhat different in the two camps. Above all, throughout the occupation, a series of dilemmas and questions arose with regards to the national political objectives.

The Liberation Front of the Slovene People, founded at the end of April 1941 as an anti-imperialist front, was composed of basic groups, such as the CPS, Catholic groups, the Slovene orientated Sokol (Falcon) members and cultural workers, and plenary groups which numbered around ten. In the Executive Committee of the LF there were only representatives of the basic groups, which shows that these represented the nucleus of the organisation and played a more important role than the plenary groups. Although, prior to the Dolomiti Declaration, the LF bore certain coalition traits, this was never a coalition of equal partners. The CPS indeed played the leading role from the very beginning of organised resistance, ensuring for itself the monopoly in the partisan army, propaganda and in the security intelligence service. As a result, its position regarding the Slovene national question eventually prevailed in the LF. Throughout, the Slovene Communists insisted on a nation's right to self-determination and on the Unified Slovenia programme.

At the beginning of the occupation, the Slovene Communists, along with many other Slovene politicians, did not believe in the possibility of Yugoslavia's restoration. They based their doubts on the pre-war hypothesis that the Second World War would trigger a worldwide revolution which would start in Nazi Germany, and also on the Soviet plans for the arrangement of Europe, which held no room for Yugoslavia, considered as an artificial creation of the Versailles Treaty. The Slovene Communists were further strengthened in such conviction by the expulsion of the Yugoslav ambassador from Moscow in May 1941, when the Hitler-Stalin pact was still in force, by which the Soviets were *de facto* endorsing the parcelling out of Yugoslavia. At the third session of the LF Supreme Plenary on September 16, 1941, the Slovene National Liberation Committee (hereafter the SNLC) was founded as "the Slovene people's only representative, organiser and leader during the liberation struggle" in order to prepare for a national revolution. In fact, it played no significant role and, after its Fourth Session on November 1, 1941, when the fundamental points of the Liberation Front were accepted, it only reconvened again in October 1943. At the founding of the SNLC, four resolutions were also adopted which, due to loose definition by the then relatively weak NLM, failed to make any major impact on Slovene society although, to some extent, they indicated the future flow of events. An attempt to implement fully the SNLC resolutions was made only after the news of the engagements between the partisans and chetniks in Serbia. This, together with the letters by the CPY Central Committee of January 1942, proved fatal in the already strained relations.

The attitude towards the Yugoslav state is ambiguous also in the fundamental points of the LF, which were relevant to its programme. In early 1942, at the initiative of Edvard Kardelj, who was in Bosnia at the time, the LF again started speaking more adamantly about self-determination, with an explicit emphasis on the right of the Slovene nation to secede, without mention of Yugoslavia. In doing so, the Slovene Communists defended the view that the Slovene nation should first gain sovereignty and only then discuss any associations. Those advocating the Yugoslav solution were branded as supporters of the Great Serbian hegemony and unitarianism. On the other hand, the counter-revolutionary side accused the LF of opposing the Yugoslav idea and supporting, in its stead, an alliance of the Central European, Soviet republics and, thereby (supposedly) selling out the

Slovene soil to Italians and Germans.

After the AVNOJ session in Bihač at the end of 1942, the CPS finally opted for the Yugoslav state framework. This did not mean that it had ever opposed it, but, rather, that it had never made itself clear on this issue. It is known that, between the mid 1920's and the mid 1930's, the CPY strove for the break up of Yugoslavia. In the second half of the 1930's, during the "people's front policy" period, it gradually changed its attitude, however without completely abandoning its original idea. The Slovene and also Yugoslav Communists viewed their attitude towards Yugoslavia through the prism of the primary strategic goal – the seizure of power and the establishment of the Bolshevik system. In Autumn 1942, following a warning by the Comintern, they finally realised that, before the end of the war and the crushing of the Axis powers, the military conflict would not turn into a revolutionary war in Europe, and that, consequently, the anti-Hitler coalition would not disintegrate. This realisation was one of the key turning points in the shaping of the strategy of the NLM, which allowed it, in the context of a general European struggle against the occupiers and Hitler, to seize power in Yugoslavia and, at the same time, execute the revolution. With this, all Communist plans for the Soviet arrangement of Europe fell through. One of the post-war aims of the anti-Hitler coalition was also the restoration of the Yugoslav state. In mid December 1942, Kardelj's made the comment to this change in his letter to Tito that "it is now obvious that the easiest way for us to become internationally established will be through Yugoslavia".

In Autumn 1942, the tendency towards the centralisation of the liberation movements in individual Yugoslav regions grew increasingly among the CPY leadership. Until then, these regional movements developed quite independently and specifically, in compliance with the general orientations of the central Yugoslav leadership. Suddenly, there was no more room for diversity and particularities. This first became clear after the arrival in Slovenia of Arso Jovanović, Head of the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav partisan forces, who by the end of 1942 started applying Bosnian models to the Slovene environment, thereby violating its sovereignty represented by the Executive Committee of the LF. The tendencies for uniformity were most strongly shown with the arrival of Ivo Lola Ribar from the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav partisan forces to Slovenia, where he remained from January to April 1943. On the basis of his remarks, the Slovene Communist leaders decided to oblige their allies in the LF to sign the Dolomiti Declaration on March 1, 1943. This act formally secured the CPS a leading role in the Liberation Front (which, in practice, it had held even before), while the Christian Socialists and the Sokol members renounced the plans for their own organisation. In this way, the Liberation Front became a monolithic organisation, which operated in concert with the Communists in other Yugoslav regions. The abolition of the Slovene particularity was also the main reason for passing the Dolomiti Declaration. As the causes for this act violated Slovene sovereignty, about which the non-Communist allies in the LF were very sensitive, the Slovene Communists concealed the true reasons for its signature, casting the responsibility on the Christian Socialists.

After the Communists had irrevocably opted for a Yugoslav state framework, it became immediately clear that the new state would be built on different foundations than the pre-war kingdom. Nevertheless, the juridical and formal solution of the Yugoslav national question remained open. At the AVNOJ session in Bihač, in the absence of the delegates from Slovenia and Macedonia, these

issues did not receive much attention. However, Edvard Kardelj, who was in Slovenia during the Bihać session and was fully aware of the exceptional importance of these issues, went out of his way to stress that the entry of the Yugoslav peoples into a new community should be formally and juridically executed in accordance with the principle of national self-determination. In his view, the very issue of national self-determination was the strongest weapon against the Greater Serbian hegemony in which he saw the greatest danger for the NLM. At the second AVNOJ session in Jajce, the decree on the federal arrangement of the new state was passed, on the basis of the right to self-determination, which meant that Kardelj's concept prevailed. He can, therefore, be considered the ideological and theoretical founder of the second Yugoslavia. In this context, the Kočevje assembly at the beginning of October 1943 was only a manifestation confirming the Slovene decision to live in a common Yugoslav state. At the Kočevje assembly, the Slovenes were given no advance assurance about their position in the new state, leaving it to the future turn of events.

The issues concerning the foundations of the future state were more than just formal and juridical. Already at the time of their shaping, various views existed on the post-war internal arrangement. The AVNOJ resolutions in Jajce, in Autumn 1943, were thus only a compromise which brought no significant change to the processes of centralisation and uniformity of individual movements, ongoing since Autumn 1942. These processes only gained strength towards the end of the war and in the first years after it. The monistic nature of the post-war regime, based on the Communist Party and the army as the bonding tissue, meant that, to a significant degree, federalism existed only as an appearance. Nevertheless, the formal and juridical attributes of statehood had their weight in the shaping of the relations in the country.

A peculiar feature of the Slovene Communists was their activity in Primorska, caught between nationalism and internationalism. In Primorska, which belonged to the Kingdom of Italy before the war, the autochthonous Italian population lived on the edge of the Slovene ethnic territory (Trieste, Gorizia). Despite attempts, at least in principle, at international cooperation between the Slovenes and Italians, this rarely materialised. In Trieste, however, there was some cooperation between the Italian and Slovene workers and also partisans. The Slovene Communists were obliged to adapt to this situation and, influenced by the general anti-Italian feeling among the Slovene population in Primorska, take a clear nationalist stand towards the Italian Communists. Furthermore, the Slovene Communists had to alter their totally negative attitude to the pre-war anti-Fascist movement in Primorska, to the point of accepting some of its aspects as positive. This, however, was done in such a way as to not jeopardise their leading role in the NLM.

The term "Slovene counter-revolution" designates all those political groups whose common characteristic was the opposition of the Liberation Front and the partisans. It displayed a variegated image, both in terms of its groups and activities. The most important were the pre-war traditional parties, especially the Catholic oriented Slovene People's Party (hereafter the SPP) and the groups which constituted the Liberal bloc. The opponents of the partisan movement were characterised by organisational disunity and geographic dispersion. Among them were also the political emigrants in Great Britain and the United States who had left their homeland after the occupation. Another important aspect of the counter-revolutionary camp, apart from disunity and dispersion, was that some of its members, in their opposition to the Communist revolution, publicly collaborated

with the occupiers. This, naturally, provoked differences in the public attitude towards the national political objectives. The clandestine members of the counter-revolution and those abroad were in a different position, in that they had no such difficulties with the shaping of the national political objectives, except for the fact that they had to do it clandestinely.

Throughout the occupation, the Slovene Liberals insisted on the legalistic principle, according to which the Yugoslav kingdom would be restored as a federation. Hence, the research on the national question in the counter-revolutionary camp focused mainly on the views by the Catholic side.

On March 30, 1941, the SPP leadership defined the strategy for the imminent wartime circumstances, which included the decision for its bodies not to cooperate with the authorities of hostile countries. In spite of this decision, on April 5, 1941, a day before Yugoslavia was attacked, Fran Kulovec and Miha Krek, the SPP leaders, through the Slovak delegate in Belgrade, sought to secure from the German authorities there the establishment of a joint Slovene-Croat state or an independent Slovene state under German protection. The most plausible reason for such a radical change in position was the discovery of the German plans regarding Yugoslavia, which were extremely unfavourable for Slovenia. Besides, Kulovec strongly doubted that Yugoslavia could ever be restored. Given that the new circumstances were the most promising for the Croats (envisaging an independent state), the initiative was directed towards a similar solution for the Slovenes. For the Catholic leaders at the time, the Croat example represented a model to be followed. In Ljubljana, in accordance with this initiative, Marko Natlačen, Civil Governor of Dravska banovina, attempted to realise the idea of an independent Slovene state under German protection. These attempts were unsuccessful as the Germans showed no interest. Later on, Natlačen turned to the Italians in an attempt to unify the Slovene ethnic territory under Italy. He formed a *consulta* which visited the Pope and Mussolini, and made another attempt to contact Hitler. Thereby he continued the initiative by Kulovec and Krek, which was based on the conviction of the long-term dominance of the Axis Powers and that the restoration of Yugoslavia under such circumstances was unlikely. Natlačen only gave up his attempts to gain the support of the Axis after his visit to Rome in June 1941, not so much because he considered his policy a failure but because there was no positive answer from the other side. Slovenia's fate was sealed even before Yugoslavia was attacked, when Hitler, during his preparations for the occupation, pointed out that the Slovenes (and Serbs) were never the friends of Germany. The attempts by Kulovec and Natlačen were therefore doomed in advance. Their problematic activity, therefore, opens a series of moral, ethic, formal and juridical issues.

After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the certainty about the Allied victory became widespread. Nevertheless, the Catholic camp was still unconvinced about the restoration of Yugoslavia, also due to the existence of the Independent State of Croatia and the violence exercised by the Ustaša regime against the Serbs. The main dilemma in the Catholic camp in Summer 1941 was, therefore, whether Slovenia as an independent country should associate with the Central European countries, or, as a part of the restored Yugoslav state, with the Balkan states. A typical illustration of the then mood in the Catholic camp is the initiative of Father Kazimir Zakrajšek who went to the United States of America, at the request of the former ban Natlačen and Ljubljana bishop Rožman, to advocate for an independent Slovene state with the American authorities.



Natlačen, the leading figure in the Catholic camp, had been more inclined towards an independent Slovene state until September 1941 when he opted for a Yugoslavia, one of whose federal units would be Unified Slovenia. At that time discussions began for the shaping of the national programme between Natlačen, the SPP leader, and Kramer, the head of the Slovene Liberals, who foresaw: 1) A restored and extended Kingdom of Yugoslavia 2) A free Slovenia as an autonomous and equal constituent of Yugoslavia, with all the pertaining economic and transportation territory, based on the ethnic principle 3) The internal arrangement of the restored Yugoslavia to be executed with the consent of all its constituent members on the basis of equal rights and responsibilities in the federation." In emphasising the federal principle, Natlačen continued the pre-war politics, although he yielded to Kramer to the extent of mentioning Yugoslavia in the first place. For the Liberals, however, the acceptance of the federalist principle meant a great turning point, especially with regards to their pre-war standpoints on the national question and internal state organisation (unitarianism and centralism). Such a compromise displeased many in the Catholic camp, so that a consensus was only reached in Spring 1942, after an intervention by some emigrant politicians and the death of Lambert Ehrlich. In any case, the national political programme of the Slovene counter-revolution became a constant thereafter and can be detected in all subsequent political statements. On November 23, 1941, the programme was presented on a London radio station by Alojzij Kuhar (hence the title "the London points"). The same position was evident in Spring 1942, in the programme of the Slovene Alliance and, then again, in the national statement issued by the National Committee for Slovenia in Autumn 1944. Finally, it appears in the last subversive act of the Slovene counter-revolution, at the "historical session of the first Slovene parliament" at Tabor, on May 3, 1945.

Notwithstanding these repetitive statements, one can still detect many burning questions, concerning the national political programme, which kept emerging in the Catholic camp, although the weight of the dilemmas shifted from the homeland to emigration. While trust in the restoration of the Yugoslav state gradually grew at home, a doubt soon occurred among the emigrants abroad as to whether the Yugoslav state could be restored at all. The most significant was the quarrel between the Slovene and Croat emigrants over the border demarcation and the constitutional character (the question of internal arrangement), which further escalated after the news from the homeland about the Ustaša massacres of the Serbian population. The concerns of the Slovene politicians strengthened further in the London environment, which also provided asylum for various political emigrants and where all possible combinations on the post-war arrangement of Europe were much discussed. They even began considering non-Yugoslav solutions, such as an independent Slovene state in the Trieste hinterland or a joint Slovene-Croat state. These options were not publicly divulged until Autumn 1942, when Miha Krek decided to inform the international public also about non-Yugoslav solutions. In January 1943, the New York Times published an article by Cyrus Leo Sulzberger, a prominent journalist, expressing the view that, should the restoration of Yugoslavia fail, the Slovenes were prepared to found an independent Slovene state with Trieste and international guarantees. The idea was not new. It revived the thoughts of Korošec in Spring 1940, when the plans for the future arrangement of Europe envisaging the establishment of a Danube federation emerged. As a counterbalance to the Austrian role in the new

federation, the idea by Arnold Toynbee from 1915 on an independent Slovene state in the Trieste hinterland was reawakened. Even before that, Krek presented this option to Bishop Rožman and the leadership of the Slovene Alliance, as a possible solution, topical in the international milieu. In Autumn 1943, Krek introduced this idea to the British who, however, discouraged him from contemplating it, as the British official political objective was the restoration of Yugoslavia. The politicians in the Slovene Alliance also disagreed with the said initiative and, with extensive argumentation, insisted on the Yugoslav solution of the Slovene national question.

During the occupation, solutions to the Slovene national question emerged which at no point envisaged the inclusion of Slovenia in Yugoslavia. Those proposing such solutions were mainly individuals or those from politically less important groups. The reasons and ideas were very different. There was also a highly ideological (anti-Communist) idea of a free Slovenia in the Trieste hinterland proposed by the informant Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik. After his withdrawal to Switzerland in Summer 1944, he submitted the idea in a special memorandum to Allan Dulles, the American representative in Switzerland.

Noteworthy as a rival alternative to the national political programme of the SPP, was the plan by Lambert Ehrlich, the leader of the so-called Guards, entitled the "Slovene issue" which was clandestinely sent to London, to Slovene representatives who were then supposed to submit it to the relevant Allied representatives. The Guards gave much consideration to the Slovene national question in various brochures and programme texts. During the occupation, they clandestinely published the journal "Slovenia and Europe" which was supposed to reflect their position that the Slovene national question should not be considered *a priori* in the framework of Yugoslavia, but by the Slovenes in Europe. The Guards defended the principle that the Slovene people should first achieve sovereignty and only then decide on possible associations. Their view was, therefore, identical with that defended by the Slovene Communists. They based their reasoning on the supposition that, for a lasting solution to the Slovene question, German influence should be pushed out from Central Europe. A territorial link with the northern Slavs could then be established and together they would dominate this part of Europe. Should this initiative regarding Central Europe, in which Catholicism was the common trait, materialise, they did not exclude association with the southern Slavic people, although this was not greatly favoured, given that it could jeopardise the prevalence of Catholicism. From this initiative, the idea of Intermarium was born, i.e. a federation of the nations between the Baltic and Aegean Seas, which was supposed to protect small Central European nations from German and Soviet danger. Erlich's proposals, unsupported by the SPP leadership, were not welcomed in Allied diplomatic circles either.

On the whole, during the Second World War there was no particular interest among the Slovenes for the post-war associations within the Central European area. This was not unusual, given their historical experience of being attacked from this very region, and the concept of Central Europe, especially in the sense of *Mitteleurope*, could even carry a negative connotation. In the search for the statehood status of Slovenia, the Yugoslav option eventually prevailed in both camps as the most realistic (for both international reasons and those of internal politics). While Slovenia's position in the new Yugoslav community was more favourable than that in the first Yugoslavia, it did not fulfil all expectations.

